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RECENT CASES
procedure, failed to consider the fact that this majority-to-convict precedure
originated in New York before the Constitution was adopted, was being used
at the time that document was adopted and basically has been used ever since. 44
With that in mind, it would be difficult to argue that the procedure violates due
process of law as it was known to the framers of that Constitution. Significant
however, is the fact that the procedure was origanally set up for the convenience
of the accused, 45 whereas today it is used to expedite the business of the
Criminal Court of the City of New York. The convenience of the court has
never been a convincing factor when weighed against the rights of an accused
in a criminal prosecution..
THomAs L. DAVID
CoRAm NOBIS-NOT AvAILABLE WHERE COUNSEL HAS FAILED TO FILE TIMELY
NOTICE OF APPEAL WHEN REQUESTED BY DEFENDANT

In two recent cases, defendants were sentenced to prison terms following
their felony convictions. Joseph Marchese and Thomas Kling decided to appeal and so informed their attorneys. Both were assured that notice of appeal
would be filed, but neither attorney took the necessary action. Attempting to
reinstate the lost right to appeal, defendants applied to their respective trial
courts by writ of error coram nobis. 1 From the orders of the trial courts
denying hearings, defendants appealed to the Appellate Division, Second Department, where the orders were affirmed. Defendants then appealed to the
Court of Appeals which held, in both cases, affirmed, without opinion (three
judges dissenting,2 voting to reverse and order hearings). Coram nobis is not
available where counsel assigned for trial (Kling) or retained by defendant
(Marchese) had been requested to file notice of appeal, had promised to do
so, but failed in that task. People v. Kling, 19 A.D.2d 750, 242 N.Y.S.2d 977
(2d Dep't 1963) (one judge dissenting), 3 aff'd mem., 14 N.Y.2d 571, 198
N.E.2d 46, 248 N.Y.S.2d 661 (1964), motion to amend remittitur granted, 14
N.Y.2d 687, 198 N.E.2d 913, 249 N.Y.S.2d 884 (1964), petition for cert. filed,
Misc. Calendar, July 1, 1964 (No. 198); People v. Marchese, 19 A.D.2d 728,
44. Supra notes 6, 8 and 10.
45. Supra note 6.
1. If the trial court found that the excuses were adequate as a matter of law, it
would order hearings to determine the factual sufficiency of defendants' assertions. Then,
upon a finding that the excuses were supported by facts, the court would vacate the
original judgment of conviction and impose a new sentence at that time. This would
have the effect of giving defendants a new time in which to appeal.
2. The same three judges dissented in both cases: Desmond, C.J., Fuld and
Bergan, JJ.
3. Noted in 15 Syracuse L. Rev. 578 (1964). Previous to this Appellate Division
decision the following occurred: Appeal dismissed, 11 A.D.2d 917 (2d Dep't 1958) (failure
to prosecute) ; cert. denied, 361 U.S. 935 (1960) ; petition for writ of habeas corpus denied,
188 F. Supp. 470 (N.D.N.Y. 1960), affirmed, 306 F.2d 199 (2d Cir. 1962) (existing state
remedy); dismissal of appeal vacated, (App. Div. 2d Dep't) 148 N.Y.L.J. 16 (Oct. 11, 1962).
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242 N.Y.S.2d 464 (2d Dep't 1963), aff'd mern., 14 N.Y.2d 695, 198 N.E.2d
916, 249 N.Y.S.2d 888 (1964), petition for cert. filed, Misc. Calendar, August
18, 1964 (No. 388).
Under the common law, review by an appellate court of a final judgment
in a criminal case was not deemed essential to due process of law. 4 It is also
well settled that there is no constitutional right to appealY Where appeal is7
allowed it is by the grace of statutory prescription.( In New York practice,
statutory provisions must be followed explicitly in order to preserve the right
to appeal. Any appeals filed thirty days after rendition of judgment,8 the statutory time limit, will be summarily dismissed. 9 There are some exceptions to
this harsh rule, 10 but these are minimal and granted only in extreme circumstances. Judgments dismissing late appeals for failure to file timely notice
are very common and it is generally held that there is no denial of due process
in such action.'1 This first hurdle of timely notice is important because once
notice has been filed defendant will be able to proceed even though he has
failed to perfect the appeal. He need only show that his neglect in failing
to perfect the appeal was excusable. The failure of an attorney which deprived
the client of his right to appeal in the instant cases could be the basis of an
excuse which would allow a defendant to proceed where the notice had been
filed. 12 But the instant cases do not deal with a failure to perfect resulting
in dismissal of the appeal. Here, no notice of appeal had ever been filed. The
questions presented in the instant cases are: (1) What remedy may the
client pursue in order to establish the neglect which led to his being denied
his right to appeal, and (2) can counsel's neglect serve as a sufficient basis
for redress?
The writ of error coram nobis utilized by Kling and Marchese in the
4. McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 688 (1894); accord, McGuire v. Hunter, 138
F.2d 379 (10th Cir. 1943), vacated on other grounds, 322 U.S. 710 (1943) ; see also 12 Am.
Jur. Constitutional Law § 638 (1938).
5. Matter of Ryan, 306 N.Y. 11, 114 N.E.2d 183 (1953); 24 C.J.S. Criminal Law
§ 1628 (1961); but see In re Opinion of the Judges, 26 Okla. Crim. 41, 221 Pac. 1041
(1924) (capital case); see also Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 22, § 1051 (1951).

6. Matter of Ryan, supra note 5; accord, People v. Gersewitz, 294 N.Y. 163, 61
N.E.2d 427 (1945), cert. dismissed, 326 U.S. 687 (1945) (petitioner died).
7. See N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 517.
8. N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 521; compare, A.B.A. Section of Judicial Administration, Internal Operating Procedures of Appellate Courts (1961) at 49 where the committee reports that ". . . the time allowed for giving notice of appeal varies from 10 to
90 days. . . " The committee further observes: "it would seem that a rule requiring notice
of appeal to be filed in 10 days, with a possible extension of up to 30 days for good
cause shown, would be desirable."
9. See, e.g., People v. King, 273 N.Y. 646, 8 N.E.2d 36 (1937). A new provision has
been incorporated into the Criminal Procedure Code which adds a safeguard to the
defendant's rights: upon dismissal the court is now required to notify the attorney who
appeared and the defendant, himself, of the action taken. See Code Crim. Proc. § 537-a.
Previously no such notice was deemed necessary.
10. N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 521-a; compare Burns' Ind. Stat. Ann. § 9-3305 (Cum.
Supp. 1964); N.H. Ann. Stat. ch. 508, § 7 (1955); R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-21-6 (1956).
11.

E.g., State v. Fordsham, 139 Mont. 222, 362 P.2d 413 (1961).

12. N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 524-a; see People v. Adams, 12 N.Y.2d 417, 190 N.E.2d
529, 240 N.Y.S.2d 155 (1963), noted in 13 Buffalo L. Rev. 162 (1963).
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instant cases has a varied history in New York criminal procedure. Traditionally, it has been used to bring to the court's attention matters occurring
during trial which did not appear on the record, and resulted in a judgment
which should never have been rendered.1 3 Accordingly, coram nobis has been
held available to review a judgment where it was alleged that the procure14
ment of a plea of guilty was based on trickery, deceit, coercion or fraud.
It is also available where incompetency of counsel is alleged, 15 raising constitutional problems of due process and right to counsel; but not where counsel's
mere negligence or error of judgment is advanced. 1 6 The New York Court
of Appeals has in recent years expanded the scope of coram nobis where no
other remedy could be utilized.17 This expanded scope makes coram nobis
available ".

.

. to secure a review of any error . . . which has deprived the

defendant of substantial justice

. .

.18 or ".

has deprived him of due process of law ....

.

. to redress an injury

. .

which

"19 Thus, where a prisoner has

been prevented by a state officer or agency from filing his timely notice of
appeal, coram nobis has been held available.20 A petition alleging that defendant's mental condition after trial had prevented him from filing notice
13. See People v. Hairston, 10 N.Y.2d 92, 176 N.E.2d 90, 217 N.Y.S.2d 77 (1961);
24 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1606(2) (1961).
14. Lyons v. Goldstein, 290 N.Y. 19, 47 N.E.2d 425 (1943); accord, People v.
Berger, 9 N.Y.2d 692, 173 N.E.2d 243, 212 N.Y.S.2d 425 (1961); People v. Picciotti,
4 N.Y.2d 340, 151 N.E.2d 191, 175 N.Y.S.2d 32 (1958); People v. Richetti, 302 N.Y. 290
(1951); People v. Kincaid, 15 A.D.2d 870, 225 N.Y.S.2d 56 (4th Dep't 1962); contra,
People v. Vellucci, 13 N.Y.2d 665, 191 N.E.2d 468, 240 N.Y.S.2d 992 (Desmond, C.J., Fuld
and Foster, JJ., dissenting), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 868 (1963); People v. Hernandez, 8
N.Y.2d 345, 170 N.E.2d 673, 207 N.Y.S.2d 668 (1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 976 (1961)
(Douglas, J., dissenting); People v. Tomaselli, 7 N.Y.2d 350, 165 N.E.2d 551, 197 N.Y.S.2d
697 (1960) (Desmond, C.J., dissenting); People v. Battice, 5 N.Y.2d 946, 156 N.E.2d 920,
183 N.Y.S.2d 564 (1959) (Desmond, C.J., and Fuld, J., dissenting, citing People v. Picciotti,
supra, and cases therein.), motion to amend remittitur granted 6 N.Y.2d 882, 160 (N.E.2d
129, 188 N.Y.S.2d 1002 (1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 967 (1960).
15. See generally Annot., 74 A.L.R.2d 1390 (1960).
16. People v. Brown, 7 N.Y.2d 359, 165 N.E.2d 557, 197 N.Y.S.2d 705 (1960)
(Desmond, C.J., dissenting, citing People v. Picciotti and People v. Richetti, supra note
14), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 821 (1961). "The test . . . is whether the alleged incompetency
of his counsel deprived the defendant of his right to adequate legal representation as
to make his conviction a mockery of justice." People v. De Bernardo, 199 Misc. 563, 569,
106 N.Y.S.2d 515, 521 (Bronx County Ct. 1950); cf. Edwards v. United States, 256 F.2d
707 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 847 (1958); Dennis v. United States, 177 F.2d
195 (4th Cir. 1949); see also Mitchell v. United States, 254 F.2d 954 (D.C. Cir. 1958)
(trial counsel refused to appeal where defendant couldn't pay fee), cert. denied, 371 U.S.
838 (1962); United States v. Peabody, 173 F. Supp. 413, (W.D. Wash. 1958) (must be
plain reversible error at trial), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 841 (1959).
17. People v. Sullivan, 3 N.Y.2d 196, 144 N.E.2d 6, 165 N.Y.S.2d 6 (1957); accord,
People v. Hairston, 10 N.Y.2d 92, 176 N.E.2d 90, 217 N.Y.S.2d 77 (1961); see 24 C.J.S.
Criminal Law § 1606(2) (1961); see generally Frank, Coram Nobis (1953).
18. Paperno & Goldstein, Criminal Procedure in New York 709 (1960).
19. People v. Sullivan, 3 N.Y.2d 196, 198, 144 N.E.2d 6, 8, 165 N.Y.S.2d 6, 9 (1957).
20. People v. Hairston, 10 N.Y.2d 92, 176 N.E.2d 90, 217 N.Y.S.2d 77 (1961)
(failure of prison officials to provide postage to make notice of appeal); People v. Guhr,
5 A.D.2d 688, 169 N.Y.S.2d 256 (2d Dep't 1957) (prevented by prison officials from
communicating with attorney, but many errors at trial also claimed); cf. Dowd v. United
States ex rel. Cook, 340 U.S. 206 (1951) (prison rules required warden to ban exit
of papers); Cochran v. Kansas, 316 U.S. 255 (1942) (officials suppressed documents).
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of appeal necessitated a hearing. 2 ' Another hearing was ordered where an
indigent defendant claimed that his counsel had told him that he couldn't
appeal because he had no funds with which to procure a transcript of the
trial record where a statute made such transcript available without cost- 2 In
another case, coram nobis relief was granted where assignment of counsel for
purposes of appeal had been denied; 23 but where counsel merely expressed
an opinion as to chances of success on appeal and defendant contended that
he had been thereby prevented from taking an appeal, coram nobis was held
24
to be unavailable
In the instant cases, the Appellate Division opinions merely reiterate the
principle that where timely notice of appeal has not been filed, coram nobis
relief is not available without a showing of action by a state agency or
officer, or where there are other mitigating circumstances such as those described above. 5 In Kling, the Appellate Division holds that there must also
be a showing of reversible error at the trial in order to be granted an appeal
once the time has run.2 6 The defendants' contentions in both cases that acts
of counsel prevented their appeals are dismissed by the Appellate Division
where it is noted that a court cannot stand as surety for the performance of
counsel. The majority was not persuaded by defendants' contentions that they
were lulled into a false sense of security by the assurances of counsel 27 Concerning the assigned versus retained aspect of counsel, the Appellate Division
further finds in Kling that the duties of assigned counsel terminate with the
rendition of judgment, and therefore any post-conviction promise by him becomes the act of retained counsel, negating any possibility of construing the
promise to act as the action of a state agency or officer or "state action."
The Appellate Division notes in both cases that granting of the relief sought
would have the effect of enlarging the time to appeal. Since precedent dictates
strict observance of the statutory limitations, it is concluded that coram
nobis should not be utilized under these circumstances. "If the time to appeal
28
is to be extended, it must be done by legislative action.1
21. People v. Hill, 8 N.Y.2d 935, 168 N.E.2d 841, 204 N.Y.S.2d 172 (1960), aflirndng
9 A.D.2d 451, 195 N.Y.S.2d 295 (2d Dep't 1959); People v. Zarcone, 15 A.D.2d 505
(2d Dep't 1961).
22. People v. Coe, 16 A.D.2d 876, 228 N.Y.S.2d 249 (4th Dep't 1962).
23. People v. Kalan, 2 N.Y.2d 278, 140 N.E.2d 357, 159 N.Y.S.2d 480 (1957) (held,
denial of rights under N.Y. Const. art. I, §§ 6, 11 (due process, equal protection)).
24. People v. Bjornsen, 40 Misc. 2d 986, 244 N.Y.S.2d 551 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
25. People v. Kling, 19 A.D.2d 750, 242 N.Y.S.2d 977 (2d Dep't 1963); People v.
Marchese, 19 A.D.2d 728, 242 N.Y.S.2d 464 (2d Dep't 1963).
26. The court cites Mitchell v. United States, 254 F.2d 954 (D.C. Cir. 1958), cert.
denied, 371 U.S. 838 (1962), for this proposition of law. This requirement of reversible
error is apparently nullified by the Court of Appeals, where reliance on Brown and
Tomaselli evidences no need for such a harsh test.
27. Kling, Brief for Appellant, pp. 5-11; Marchese, Brief for Appellant, pp. 5-6.
28. People v. Kling, 19 A.D.2d 750, 751, 242 N.Y.S.2d 977, 979; People v. Marchese,
19 A.D.2d 728, 242 N.Y.S.2d 464; accord, People v. Roberts, 25 Misc. 2d 321, 325, 201
N.Y.S.2d 844, 848 (Oneida County Ct. 1960): "While this may seem a harsh result, it is a
problem for the Legislature and not the Courts," rev'd on other grounds, 13 A.D.2d 719,
213 N.Y.S.2d 833 (4th Dep't 1961) (The reversal was required because a hearing was
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In Kling, the majority in the Court of Appeals based their holding solely
3
29
on the authority of two cases: People v. Tomaselli, and People v. Brown
Tomaselli, aged sixteen at the time of his trial, had urged inadequacy of counsel where counsel had been assigned from the courtroom at the arraignment,
had conferred with him for ten minutes, and when Tomaselli admitted his
guilt, urged him to plead guilty. Brown's court-appointed counsel had advised
against calling eyewitnesses who had made favorable statements about him.
A hearing of these charges was not required in either case. The reasoning
was that it would be futile to hold a hearing because, as a matter of law,
no relief could be granted even if defendants' assertions were found to be factually true. The dissenters in Kling also relied on two cases: People v. Hairston,81 and People v. Adams. 82 Hairston had been prevented by prison officials
from complying with the thirty day time limit for filing notice of appeal.
Adams' court-appointed counsel had filed a notice of appeal but the appeal
was dismissed for failure to perfect. Adams contended that he lost the right
to appeal without ever knowing he had it, since his counsel had never informed
him of any action taken. In both cases, defendants stated sufficient facts which
as a matter of law would entitle them to relief. Therefore, it was held that
hearings were necessary at which defendants would have an opportunty to substantiate their assertions. The Court of Appeals in Marckese was totally mute.
No authority was cited by either majority or minority. For the purposes of this
note, the writer has assumed that People v. Kling was controlling.
Were either of these cases civil actions, neglect of this degree would be
expected to give rise to liability on the part of the attorneys involved. 33 But
here, forfeiture of the right to appeal has resulted in the continued imprisonment of defendants, with no relief in sight. In a recent federal criminal case,
it was stated that ". . . one who justifiably believes that he is represented
by counsel and who instructs his counsel to appeal and is assured by counsel
that the appeal will be filed, should not suffer a loss of rights if counsel proves
But that very right to appeal has been forfeited in the instant
faithless .... ,,34
cases. In cases where state action was alleged it has been relatively easy for
the Court of Appeals to order a hearing. 35 In Kling, however, no state action
was apparent. 36 The Appellate Division would further require a showing of
necessary to determine the truth of incompetency of counsel charges-notice of appeal
grounds were insufficient in themselves.).
29. 7 N.Y.2d 350, 165 N.E.2d 551, 197 N.Y.S.2d 697 (1960) (Desmond, C.J., dissenting).
30. 7 N.Y.2d 359, 165 N.E.2d 557, 197 N.Y.S.2d 705 (1960) (Desmond, C.J., dissenting).
31. 10 N.Y.2d 92, 176 N.E.2d 90, 217 N.Y.S.2d 77 (1961).
32. 12 N.Y.2d 417, 190 N.E.2d 529, 240 N.Y.S.2d 155 (1963), noted in 13 Buffalo
L. Rev. 162 (1963).
33. See generally Annot., 45 A.L.R.2d 5 (1956); see Pete v. Henderson, 124 Cal.
App.2d 487, 269 P.2d 78 (1st Dist., Div. I 1954).
34. Calland v. United States, 323 F.2d 405 (7th Cir. 1963). It must be noted, however, that the dissenting judge would require a further showing of reversible error.
35. See authorities cited note 20 supra.
36. The appellant in Marchese did not seek to invoke state action but rather ad-
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reversible error.3 7 This requirement would seem to be satisfied, if at a hearing,
Kling's contentions of coached identification and suppression of evidence could
be substantiated. It seems, however, that this is not what is required. The
state's Brief on Appeal verbalized the true requirement :38
To grant special permission to this appellant, because his rights
were allegedly lost by an act of omission of another, but not by the
State or by the Court, does not preclude or bar a requirement that
appellant show that such grant is not a worthless gesture. A showing
of merit, is particularly required here ....
But, it must be remembered, the very purpose of the hearing is to assess the
merit of defendant's allegations. A requirement of a showing of merit to
qualify for a hearing is premature to say the least. It should be sufficient that
the defendant allege facts which as a matter of law would entitle him to relief
should they be found true upon a determination at a hearing. The majority
of the Court of Appeals- in Kling relies wholly on Brown and Tomaselli,
disposing of the case on state action grounds. Cases granting hearings where
9
there was no state action alleged are seemingly dismissed without comment.3
Appellant, in an attempt to get within the state action formulation, argued
that assignment of counsel by a court is tantamount to state action. But the
Appellate Division sidestepped this argument by holding that the duties of
assigned counsel terminate with the rendition of judgment, converting any act
of counsel after trial into the act of retained counsel. The lack of usefulness
of this distinction between assigned and retained counsel is conceded even by
the state in Marchese.40 This writer has also been informed that during the
oral argument of Marchese the Court of Appeals noted that any argument on
this question would not be profitable. In any event, the cases have not held
the actions of assigned counsel to be state action; 41 therefore, for purposes
of the instant cases, the distinction is entirely irrelevant. 42 Neither the Court
dressed himself to the problem by arguing that coram nobis should be available where
appeal has been prevented merely by circumstances beyond his control as was the case
in both Hairston and Adams.
37.

19 A.D.2d at 750, 242 N.Y.S.2d at 979.

38. Brief for Respondent, p. 14.

39. E.g., People v. Hill, 8 N.Y.2d 935, 168 N.E.2d 841, 204 N.Y.S.2d 172 (1960);
People v. Kincaid, 15 AJD.2d 870, 225 N.Y.S.2d 56 (4th Dep't 1962).
40. Brief for Respondent, p. 4; accord, Porter v. United States, 298 F.2d 461 (5th
Cir. 1962); see Waltz, Inadequacy of Trial Defense Representation as a Ground for PostConviction Relief in Criminal Cases, 59 Nw. U.L. Rev. 289, 300 & n.72 (1964); but cf.
People v. Kling, Brief for Respondent, p. 12: "Neither as retained counsel nor as assigned
counsel, was the obligation of [counsel] to file the Notice of Appeal attributable to the

Court or to the State. Even if [counsel] had promised to do this gratuitous act, coram
nobis relief is not available. .. "
41. See People v. Hernandez, 8 N.Y.2d 34 , 170 N.E.2d 673, 207 N.Y.S.2d 668 (1960),
cert. denied, 366 U.S. 976 (1961); People v. Tomaselli, 7 N.Y.2d 350, 165 N.E.2d 551,
197 N.Y.S.2d 687 (1960).
42. The rationale that the acts of assigned counsel are state action is further exploded
when it is realized that both assigned and retained counsel are equally officers of the court.
The real issue is the harm done by counsel due to his failure to act, not the characterization of it as the act of either assigned or retained counsel. This idea is unsuccessfully argued
in Marchese. Perhaps of special note is a rule recently promulgated by the Appellate
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of Appeals nor the Appellate Division in Kling or Marchese discuss a lower
court decision rendered in the previous year. In that case a hearing was
granted when the defendant was prevented from complying with the statutory
requirements because his attorney had promised to file a notice of appeal, but
because the trial fees had not been fully paid, failed to do so. 43 It is assumed

that such a holding would not withstand attack on appeal.
The legislative intent to deal strictly with excuses concerning notices of
appeal is reduced by the Court of Appeals to terms of state action. But in
considering the state and federal constitutional guarantees of right to counsel,
due process and equal protection, 44 both appellants have constructed arguments which deserve some notice. The larger issue in the instant cases is
whether neglect of counsel is at least equal to the frustration of an appeal
due to state action as defined by the New York courts. Surely an accused
".. . requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step of the proceedings
against him. . .. ,,45 The argument that a decision allowing hearings in cases
such as these will encourage persons to attack the competency of their counsel
is hardly sufficient. The federal courts have held that once the state provides
an appellate procedure, due process and equal protection must be accorded. 4 6
Therefore, ". . . the possibility, or probability, that such [hearings] will be
numerous is no answer at all .

.

. .4 Where constitutional questions of such

import are raised, as they have been in the instant cases, 48 "fundamental concepts of due process, decisions of the United States Supreme Court and of our
own [Court of Appeals], and the very nature Qf the coram nobis type of reliefall demand a trial of such sworn assertions." 49 The question of practical consequence now is: Will the strength of the state action concept be deemed a
sufficient basis for the decisions of the New York Court of Appeals or will
the United States Supreme Court be forced to deal with the constitutional
questions of due process and right to effective counsel?
DAVID GERALD JAY

Division, Fourth Department (Unnumbered Rule, effective Apr. 2, 1964, as reported in
Buffalo Daily Law Journal, April 9, 1964, p. 1, col. 1) requiring assigned trial counsel, if
requested by defendant, to file notice of appeal before duties are fully discharged. In this
connection, a recent federal case is pertinent: Coffman v. Bomar, 220 F. Supp. 343 (M.D.
Tenn. 1963) (habeas corpus utilized to void a conviction where counsel failed to satisfy
specific statutory duty requiring state court-appointed counsel to perfect appeal, in contravention of fourteenth amendment guarantees).
43. People v. Longale, 37 Misc. 2d 528, 235 N.Y.S.2d 871 (Jefferson County Ct.),
aff'd mere., 19 A.D.2d 696, 242 N.Y.S.2d 635 (4th Dep't 1963) ; but see Owsley v. Cunningham, 190 F. Supp. 608, 611 (E.D. Va. 1961) (". . . failure of an attorney to note and
perfect an appeal affords no right to a hearing under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255.").
44. U.S. Const. amend. VI & XIV; N.Y. Const. art. I, §§ 6, 11; see Note, Effective
Assistance of Counsel, 49 Va. L. Rev. 1531 (1963).
45. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932).
46. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
47. People v. Richetti, 302 N.Y. 290, 295, 97 N.E.2d 908, 910 (1951).
48. People v. Kling, Brief for Appellant, pp. 15-23, People v. Marchese, Brief for
Appellant, pp. 8-10.
49. People v. Richetti, 302 N.Y. 290, 295, 97 N.E.2d 908, 910 (1951).

